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The Demise of Regulation Q Differentials:
Competition For Household Savings Between
Commercial Banks and Savings and Loan
Associations - A Note
William R. Reichenstein
and
Frederick H. Dorner

In a recent a rticle (1) in this Review, W.S. Rawson a nd F.J. Ingram (RI) examine the influence of the spread between interest rates
available on household deposits at savings and loan associations
and commercia l banks on the proportion of deposits at these institutions held in commercial banks. A review of the literature reveals
that a large portion of the change in relative deposit holdings a t
S&Ls and CBs from 1947 through 1964 can be explained by
movements in the interest rate differential (2). RI extend the above
study to include the more recent yea rs and conclude that "since
1967 if not earlier. interest differentials (within the range studied)
have had no statistically significant impac t on the flow of household
savings between the commercial banking and savings and loan
association sectors." (1, p. 34) Furthermore, they find this insensitivity to interest rate differentials to be true of both passbook
deposits and nonpassbook deposits.
We contend that the structural form of their tests are improper
and that after proper testing, relative holdings of pass book accounts are sensitive to the rate differential while the nonpassbook
accounts are not sensitive to the interest rate differential. Furthermore, these results are not only reasonable. but they are expected
due to the impact of Regula lion Q ceilings first imposed in 1965.
Regulation Q and the Interest Differentials Between S & Ls and

CBs.

RI properly assess that there was a s tructural shift in the relationship between relative holdings of deposits at CBs and the interest rate spread between the periods 1947-64 and 1965-77. Many
factors could have caused the structural shift but perhaps the most
obvious fa ctor is the imposition of Regulation Q ceilings beginning in
1965. Unlike the 1947-64 period. savings rates available at
depository institutions since 1965 have usually been far less than
competitive rates available from money market securities. To assess
the expected impact of the rate ceilings on passbook and nonpassbook accounts it is necessary to examine the major fa ctors influencing the demand for each type of deposit.
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Passbook deposits are primari~y held as ? precautionary demand for money. The extra convenience and liquidity of passbook
deposits makes money market securities a poor substitute for th
passbook accounts. Rela live interest rates between S & Ls and CBse
however, should influence individuals' choice of location for th,
passbook accounts; the t is, passbook accounts a I S & Ls and CBs ar:
hypothesized to be close substitutes even in a Regulation Q environment and should demonstra le the expected sensitivity to the interest
ra le differential.
On the other hand, the demand for nonpassbook accounts may
be determined by convenience. liquidity. rate of return, and lack of
knowledge concerning other alterna lives. In an environment lacking
effective Regula lion Q ceilings. an individual would likely choose 8
bank or savings and loan based largely on interest rates and convenience. This hypothesis is. of course. consistent with the 1947-64
data. In the financial environment since 1965, however, the interest
ra le differential between S & Ls and CBs is not expected to be particula rly important. The interest sensitive funds abandoned both
depository institutions in search of the substantially higher rates
available on money market securities, the familiar process known as
disintermedia lion. The exodus of interest sensitive funds leads to
the hypothesis that the rate differential is unimportant in determining the loca lion of the non passbook deposits since 1965.

Empirical Tests
Economic theory on the demand for financial assets stipulates
that the demand function be cast in real or inflation adjusted terms.
It also stipula tes that the level of deposits be a function of the level
of interest rates or the change in deposits be a func tion of the
change in rates. The appropriate functio na l form for RI and
Vernon's studies should be the cha nge in proportion of funds held at
CBs as a function of the change in the spread.
The a uthors mention the hypothesis that the full impact of
"changes in interest ra te differentials"[emphasis added) may occur
over a considerable pe riod of time. [I, pp. 27-29) It is curious,
therefore, that they failed to consider this possibility by including
lagged values of c hanges in the ra le spread.
The app ropriate s truc tura l form of the regressions in general
te rms is:
(1)

ASt = f(6DIFFt , 6DIFFt-1, ... , 6DIFFt-n)
where
6S = change in the proportion of CB holdings of deposits at S & Ls
and CBs,
6 DIFF = change in the r a te differential between returns to savers
in S & Ls a nd CBs .
The length of the lag, n, if a ny, is an empirical question.
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o e further change is warranted for the passbook regression.
The c: ange in the passbook spread (APDIFF) never exceeds in abte value .07 and averages a mere .02 for the 19741 to 1977III
soIu
h
. h
d.
period. Obviously the almost nonexistent c a_nges m l e spre~ . m
these periods prevents the independent variable from explammg
movements in the dependent variable. This does not imply that
changes in the spread. should the\' orrur. would not cause a change
in banks' relative holdings of passbook arrounts. Consequentlv.
these periods should be elimina led to more clearly assess the impac t
of changes in the spread on the dependent variable.
Regression (1) for passbook deposits for the 19681-73III period
produces the following results: 1
APSt = .48 · 3.33 b PDIFFt · 3.45 bPDIFFt-1
(3.o6r
(3.24r
R2
= .65
t - statistics m parentheses
• significant at 1 percent level

Clearly changes in the rate differenllal in the time frame \'\,here
they exhibit meaningful variation can account for a large percent of
the variation m the relative holdings of passbook accounts.
Regression (1) for non passbook deposits for the 67II-77III period
using obvious notation is:
ANSt = -1.28 · 0.14 ANDIFFt
(0.01)
R2
= .00
t- statistics in parentheses
Several lag lengths were examined but the nonpassbook rate
differential never exhibited significance al the 10 percent level. Furthermore, the F-ratio never approached significance al the usual
levels. Thus. the changes in the ra le differential in the period since
the imposition of Regi.lalion Q do not appear to be significant factors
in individuals' choice of depository institution for nonpassbook
deposits. This does not imply that relative ralPs of return at
depository institutions will not influence the loc.1tion of nonpassbook
accounts in an environment lacking effective Regulation Q ceilings.
1Two observations were lost due to taking changes in the spread
a_n? the one period lag. A two period lag was examined but the coeff1c1ent on the second lagged variable proved insignificant at the 10
percent level. The same criterion was used to eslima le the other lag
lengths. The similar regression over the 19681-7711 period is:

APSt = .37 · 3.15 bPDIFFt -2.05 APDIFF t-1
(2.09)..
(1 .52)
R2 = .26
• • significant a I 5 percent level
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In fact. reviewing Vernon's study for 1947-64 but substituting the
change in spread for the independent variable produces:

llSt = -1.91 · 610.01 APt
R2

= .51

(3.98)

t • statistics in parentheses
• significant at 1 percent level.

These results clearly indicate that the rate differential wasao
important factor influencing individuals' choice of deposit location
in the non-Regulation Q environment. Although the above results examine a period prior to the rapid growth of nonpassbook accounts,
theoretical considerations suggest that the rate di fferential will
regain its importance in determining the loca lion of non passbook aecounts when Regulation Q ceilings become ineffective.
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